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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Appellant Jose Ramon DeLeon-Pineda challenges his sentence based on the 
District Court’s denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. 
§ 3E1.1 and substantive unreasonableness.  For the reasons stated below, we affirm.   
I.  Factual and Procedural Background 
In June 2018, DeLeon-Pineda entered into a plea agreement with the Government 
and ultimately pled guilty to distribution and possession of 100 grams or more of heroin, 
and 28 grams or more of crack cocaine, and to possession with intent to distribute an 
amount of heroin, cocaine, and crack equivalent to at least 100 but less than 400 
kilograms of marijuana.     
His guilty plea was based on the following factual allegations.  From about June 
2016 to March 2017, federal agents and officers made controlled purchases of heroin 
supplied by DeLeon-Pineda and eventually obtained probable cause for a Title III wiretap 
against him.  Intercepted calls established he was obtaining supplies of heroin and 
redistributing via a network of street dealers, runners, and addicts.  He set prices, 
arranged for deliveries (which he made personally or directed a subordinate to make), and 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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collected payments.  He directed co-conspirators as to where and what drugs to deliver, 
obtained drugs from multiple suppliers, and “cook[ed]” powder cocaine into cocaine 
base, or crack.  App. 61–62. 
 DeLeon-Pineda had no employment during the period charged in the indictment, 
kept a “stash house” (a separate residence where he did not reside, for the purpose of 
storing drugs, money, and a firearm), employed several individuals with addiction issues 
to further his drug-trafficking activities, and specifically targeted heroin addicts for his 
drug sales.   
The investigation also uncovered violent and threatening conduct by DeLeon-
Pineda.  He told an unindicted co-conspirator that he would be late with a payment 
because he, Pineda, had shot an unidentified Puerto Rican individual and was waiting for 
the “waters to settle.”  The Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) confirmed that local 
police officials had investigated reports of a shooting that occurred shortly before that 
intercepted call at a local restaurant.  Additionally, in one instance DeLeon-Pineda 
demanded payments from a co-conspirator, and he told others that he had a gun and 
would shoot the co-conspirator at their next meeting if he did not pay in time. 
In July 2018, less than a month after pleading guilty, DeLeon-Pineda and five 
other inmates at the county prison assaulted another prisoner by punching and kicking 
him after he was tackled.  DeLeon-Pineda was placed in restricted housing as a result of 
the attack.  No criminal charges were filed against the participants of the fight.   
The Sentencing Guidelines range for DeLeon-Pineda was 188 to 235 months.  At 
the sentencing hearing, DeLeon-Pineda objected to the Guidelines calculation on 
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numerous grounds, including specifically the denial of acceptance of responsibility points 
and the cumulative effect of the many enhancements applied, among others, for his 
leadership role and possession of a firearm in connection with his drug dealing.  The 
District Court denied the three-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility because 
of the inmate fight and applied all the enhancements recommended by the Presentence 
Report, finding that the Guidelines allowed for duplicative and cumulative enhancements.  
The Court ultimately imposed a sentence of 188 months in prison, to be followed by four 
years of supervised release.   
II.  Analysis1 
A.  Acceptance of Responsibility Reduction 
We review for clear error the District Court’s factual determination of whether 
DeLeon-Pineda was entitled to an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction in his sentence.  
United States v. DeLeon-Rodriguez, 70 F.3d 764, 767 (3d Cir. 1995).  Whether the Court 
correctly interpreted U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 is a legal question subject to de novo review.  
United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 655 (3d Cir. 1991).   
DeLeon-Pineda has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence 
that he is entitled to an offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.  See 
United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 193 (3d Cir. 2002).  Section 3E1.1(a) of the 
Sentencing Guidelines states: “If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of 
responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by [two] levels.”  U.S.S.G. 
 
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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§ 3E1.1(a).  The Commentary gives numerous factors that a district court may consider in 
determining whether a defendant has demonstrated an acceptance of responsibility under 
§ 3E1.1.  One is “(B) voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or 
associations[.]”  U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 Application Note 1(B). 
We have previously held that “a plea of guilty is not dispositive as to the 
defendant’s acceptance of responsibility,” United States v. Singh, 923 F.2d 1039, 1043 
(3d Cir. 1991), and that “the Guidelines make clear that a guilty plea does not carry with 
it an automatic entitlement to credit for acceptance of responsibility.”  United States v. 
Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 197 (3d Cir. 1998).  It “may constitute evidence of 
acceptance of responsibility, but the sentencing court [is] free to consider other evidence 
that is inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility[.]”  Id.  “A guilty plea in acceptance 
of responsibility may be outweighed by conduct that is inconsistent with such 
acceptance.”  United States v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 1996); see also 
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.3.  
Here, the only evidence that DeLeon-Pineda accepted responsibility is that he 
entered a guilty plea.  He presented no other evidence before the District Court.  It 
conducted a fact-specific assessment and weighed the dearth of evidence presented by 
DeLeon-Pineda against the evidence of the prison fight.  After considering reports about 
the fight filed by several officers, the Court articulated several factual findings explaining 
its decision to deny the application of the Section 3E1.1 reduction.   
The Court first concluded that the prison incident was not a “fight,” but an 
“ambush,” because it did not involve a one-on-one fight between two inmates.  App. 108.  
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It stated that in such a case it would have ruled differently.  The circumstances here 
indicated that DeLeon-Pineda was engaged in criminal association with others and agreed 
with them to carry out an assault.  The Court considered this to be evidence that he had 
not accepted responsibility for his crimes.  Second, the Court found that the attack was 
evidence that DeLeon-Pineda had not abandoned his propensity for violence.  It noted 
that if DeLeon-Pineda’s “involvement with the sale of drugs was non-violent, I would 
take that into consideration, but the facts are . . . there is violence interwoven with the 
crimes . . . . I must take that into account here in determining whether there was genuine 
remorse . . . .”  App. 110–11. The Court cited to the portions of the record detailing how 
DeLeon-Pineda possessed and carried a firearm while trafficking drugs, admitted in a 
recorded conversation that he shot someone, and threatened to shoot a subordinate who 
owed him a drug debt.   
 The District Court did not clearly err in finding that any demonstration of 
acceptance of responsibility inherent in DeLeon-Pineda’s guilty plea was outweighed by 
the violent assault he engaged in with others while awaiting sentencing.  It was not 
required to base its holding on any subsequent criminal charges, but only had to consider 
whether DeLeon-Pineda engaged in conduct inconsistent with acceptance of 
responsibility.  Ceccarini, 98 F.3d at 130.  The Court relied on persuasive case law from 
our sister circuits that violent conduct while in custody awaiting sentencing is 
inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.  See, e.g., United States v. Prince, 204 
F.3d 1021, 1023–24 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a defendant’s attack on a fellow 
prisoner while awaiting sentencing for bank robbery could be considered in assessing 
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acceptance of responsibility).  Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s denial of the 
acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.   
B.  Substantive Unreasonableness  
We review sentences for substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion 
standard, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Tomko, 562 
F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc), and “affirm a procedurally sound sentence as 
substantively reasonable unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the 
same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  
United States v. Handerhan, 739 F.3d 114, 124 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  We may presume that a sentence within the advisory Guidelines is reasonable.  
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 364 (2007); Handerhan, 739 F.3d at 124. 
DeLeon-Pineda does not allege any procedural deficiency in his sentencing.  We 
explain above why his argument regarding the reduction for acceptance of responsibility 
fails.  His only other arguments are that the District Court unfairly applied multiple 
enhancements and did not properly consider mitigating factors.  He broadly argues that 
the nature of his offense cannot justify the sentence and that the length is unduly punitive.  
These arguments also fail.  
First, although DeLeon-Pineda contends that the enhancements the Court applied 
unfairly “overlap,” he does not argue that any of the enhancements were unsupported a 
preponderance of evidence, and he does not point us to any case law (and we are aware of 
none) suggesting that these specific enhancements may not be applied together.  DeLeon-
Pineda Br. 28.  We see no error in the District Court’s Guidelines calculations.  DeLeon-
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Pineda was responsible for the distribution and possession with intent to distribute of 
over 100 grams of heroin and over 28 grams of cocaine base, or crack, and 49 grams of 
cocaine, resulting in a base offense level of 24.  He organized and led the operation, 
resulting in an increase of four levels.  He possessed a firearm that had a nexus to his 
drug trafficking, resulting in an increase of two levels.  He employed violence, resulting 
in a two-level increase.  He maintained a separate residence where he stored drugs, 
money, and at least one gun, also resulting in a two-level increase.  Finally, he had no 
legitimate income, but made his entire livelihood from his criminal activity, resulting in a 
two-level increase.  We fail to see how any of these enhancements are duplicative.  The 
possession of the firearm and the use of and threat of violence are different and separate 
conduct.  And a leadership-role enhancement does not capture conduct involving the 
maintenance of a stash house, nor does either of those enhancements capture making a 
criminal livelihood, and so they are not unfairly duplicative.  Indeed, the livelihood 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(15)(E) cannot apply unless the defendant also 
receives the leadership-role enhancement.   
Second, despite DeLeon-Pineda’s argument to the contrary, the District Court did 
indeed consider the mitigating factors that this was his first offense and that he faced 
deportation after serving his sentence.  The Court listed the mitigating factors and still 
found that “the evidence is substantial and compelling that the Defendant made his living 
by leading a drug distribution conspiracy that involved his use of firearms, violence and a 
stash house as the leader of five or more others engaged in criminal activity at his 
direction.”  App. 126.  The Court also considered the § 3553(a) factors but nonetheless 
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exercised discretion in imposing a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range.  That it 
did not vary downward because of the mitigating factors does not make the sentence 
unreasonable.  See United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 204–205 (3d Cir. 2007).  
DeLeon-Pineda’s sentence is thus not substantively unreasonable.  
* * * * * 
Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s denial of a reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility and hold that DeLeon-Pineda’s sentence was not substantively 
unreasonable.  
